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FIRST, DO NO HARM: WHY DOCTORS ARE NOT 
OMNIPOTENT UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH 
DISABILITIES ACT 
Sharona Hoffinan • 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Americans with Disabilities Act1 ("ADA") was designed to 
"provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate forthe elimination 
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities,"2 as well as those 
who are wrongly regarded as having a disabiiity.3 Under the ADA, 
employers are prohibited from discriminating against individuals with 
respect to hiring, firing, promotion, and otheremployment decisions.4 
The statute, however, does not forbid employers from requiring 
applicants for employment to undergo physical examinations, nor from 
basing employment decisions upon the results of medical screening.5 The 
. . 
ADA provides no explicit guidance as to what responsibility the 
employer retains under the Act once it has sent the candidate to the 
physician. And therein lies the problem: if the physician concludes that 
"' B.A.,l985, Wellesley College; J.D., 1988, Harvard Law School. Ms. Hoffinan is a Senior 
Trial Attorney in the EqualEmployment Opportunity Commission's Houston District Office and an 
adjunct professor at South Texas College of Law. The views .expressed in this article represent the 
personal views and opinions of its author and are not intended to represent the views of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission or any other United States governmental agency. 
I. 42 u.s.c. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). 
2. !d.§ 1210l(b)(l). 
3. See id. § 121 02(2)(C). 
4. See id. § 121 12(a). 
5. See id. § 121 12(d)(3r The physical examination may be conducted only after an offer of 
employment has been extended to a c~didate. The offer must be a bona fide offer which is 
conditioned only upon the results of the medical examination. See id. Moreover, if the physical 
examination reveals a physical or mental limitation which rises to the level of a disability in a 
candidate who is otherwise qualified for the job, the employer must offer the employee a ieasonable 
accommodation unless it can show that the needed accommodation would impose·an undue hardship 
upon the operation of its business. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). · 
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the o;employer should not hire an individuaV can the employer rely 
unquestioninglyuponthe doctor's recommendation in making an adverse 
employment decision? What jf the doctor's conclusion is based upon 
prejudice and misconception rather than upon relevant inedical data? 
What if the doctor disqualifies the -individual not because he or she is 
physically incapable of performing. the essential job duties with or 
without a reasonable accommodation, but because the individual is 
overw~ig)Jt, b,as ~ p_a.st_llis!OJY of cancer, or has some medical condition 
which requires expensive tr~atrnent and ~11 raise the employer's 
insurance costs? Must the employer then send all individuals who have 
received a- negative evaluation from the physician to another doctor for 
a second opinion? Should the company attempt to assess on its own 
whether following-the doctor's advice would cause it to violate the anti-
discrilnina:tion mandate of the ADA? If so, how should it go about doing 
so? ... -· 
This articl~ argues that employers are not shielded from liability 
under the ADA if they rely upon the advice of a doctor in making an 
adverse employment decision. The question of the extent to which 
employers can rely upon .the opinion. of a single doctor for purposes of 
avoidilig liability und~r the ADA is a significant question of statutory 
iilterpretation. According toone study, approximately forty-nine percent 
of new employees SUrVeyed were required to undergo pre-employment 
medical examinations.7 In rejecting an applicant, it is not uncommon for 
employers to rely exclusively upon the advice of a doctor without any 
further~~lygs_.a.sto_vyl!c;;tll~r t)Je candidate could perform the job duties 
in question in light of the medical condition diagnosed by the physi-
cian. 8 The ADA's prohibition of disability discrimination would be 
rendered nearly meaningless if an employer could blindly accept the 
negative recommendation of its doctor, no matter how baseless or 
contrary to law the recommendation is. 
6. The arguments developed in this article can also be applied to situations in which an 
employer sends a current employee · io a physician and subsequently decides to tenninate the 
individual based upon the doctor's recommendlltion. For the sake of simplicity, however, the author 
will ref'er in the . text mily to the more common scenario in which the individual is not yet an 
employee arid the employer ba8es an adverse hiring decision upon the results of a pre-employment 
physical. · 
7. See JayS. Himmelstein, Worker Fitness and Risk Evaluations in Context, 3 OCCUPATIONAL 
MED.: ST. ART REVIEWS 169, 176 (1988) (citation omitted). 
8. See Gary Taylor, Note From the Doctor Can Land Employers in Court, NAT'L L.J., June 
10, 1996, at B-I'. . 
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The author concludes that an employer's reliance upon the opinion 
of a doctor for purposes of rejecting an applicant does not establish a 
defense under the ADA. If the employer's refusal to hire an individual 
constitutes a violation of the ADA, the physician's involvement in the 
decision-making probess'doe~diot alleviate the employer's responsibility 
for the discriminatory act and does not eliminate liability under the 
statute. 
This thesis is bolstered by a recent case litigated by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Coinmission ("EEOC") against a Houston bus 
company, Texas Bus Lines, Inc.9 In resolving the issues of liability on 
summary judgment, a district court determined the following: 
If an employer's relationship with a physician who conducts a medical 
examination resUlts in the discriminatory rejection of applicants 
protected by the ADA, the employer is liable for a violation of the 
statute despite the involvement of a third party, the doctor, with whom 
the employer had a professional arrangement. 10 
In formulating this argument, the article will analyze the Texas Bus 
Lines case and its implications. The relevant language of the ADA and 
its implementing regtllations \vill also be examined. Finally, the paper 
will outline means by which employers who rely upon medical examina-
tions fu making hiring decisions may insure compliance with ADA 
requirements. 
9. See EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965 (S.D. Tex. 1996). 
10. Jd. at 982. The opinion grantf;d the EEOC's motion for partial summary judgment only in 
part since the court mled against the EEOC on one issue. See id. The court found that Texas Bus 
Lines did not violate the ADA when it included medical questions on its application form. See id. 
The EEOC had contended that this practice was contrary to the ADA's mandate that medical 
examinations could be conducted only after a conditional job offer is extended to a candidate and 
that no medical inquiries could be made of applicants prior to that time. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12112(d)(2)(A)-(3) (1994). The court held that because the Department of Transportation 
Regulations specify that particular medical conditions disqualify individuals from employment as 
drivers, Texas Bus Lines did not violate the ADA by including questions as to those conditions on 
its application form. See Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. at 981. The decision thus appears limited 
to medical questions asked by companies subject to DOT regulations. See id. It should also be noted 
that Texas Bus Lines· voluntarily eliminated the medical inquiries from its application form in 
September of 1994, after befug advised to do so by the EEOC. See id. at 968 n.2. 
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IT. EEOC V. TEXAS Bus LINES: THE FACTS OF TIIE CASE AND Irs 
RULING 
Ms. · Arezella Manuel; an experienced bus driver, applied for 
employment at Texas Bus Lines in March :of 1994. She was five· feet 
seven inches tall arid weighed 345 pounds:11 
Ms, _Ma,tlUJ~Lfill~(LQ!!lJ!IL~;tppllc;:ttion for employment at Texas Bus 
Lines on March 2~~ 1994. 1~ .On the. application form she provided 
information about her full employment history and indicated that she had 
won a safety award at a previous jobY She then had a personal 
interview with· a manager .. named Larry Evans. 14 Mr; Evans ·· was 
impressed by Ms .. Manuel's job experien.ce and by the references given 
byher former: employers.1s.During her half hour interview, Mr. Evans 
found. Ms. 1\tt:anp.el'to be.yery personable and concluqe&d'that she would 
be congenial and polite to passengers.16 Upon checking her credentialS; 
Evans determined that Manuel's driving record was "clean."17 He 
testified that he did not believe that.Ms, Manuel moved awkwardly when 
she entered the room ·and sat down . and "did not think that she was 
heavier than !llan:f of the other Orivers _hired by Texas Bus Lines."18 
Mr. Evans, a manager with 19 years of experience in.the.transpor-
tation industry; was not at all troubled by Manuel's obesity and did not 
believe that it would impede her performance in any way. Evans, in fact, 
was so convinced by· Ms. Manuel's qualifications, that he extended a 
conditional offer of employment to her. 19 
r-< 
II. See :Texas B!is Lines, 923 F. Supp. at 967 n.l. A person is considered to be "morbidly 
obese if she weighs either more than twice her optimal weight or. more than 100 pounds over her 
optimal weight." Cook v. Rhode Island, Dept. of Mental Health, Retardation & Hosp., 10 F.3d 17, 
20 n.l (1st Cir. ·1993). The .Texas Bus .Lines court noted that according to medical charts, Ms. 
Manuel "should weigh between·122_and 154 pounds," and that "[a]t 35.4 pounds," she was "clearly 
over twice .her optimal weight .... " Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. at 967 n.l. 
12. !d. at 967. .~ 
13. S~e Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability Exhibit 3, 
EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (No. H-95-3981). 
14. See Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. at 971. 
15. See id. 
16. Id. 
17. !d. 
18. !d. 
19. Seeid. 
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Ms. Manuel's job offer was conditioned upon her passing a driving 
test, a medical examination, and a motor vehicle check.20 When she 
took her driving test on March 8, 1994, Ms. Manuel was deemed 
qualified with respect to all of the tasks which she performed and 
received no negative commentsin the ''remarks" section of the Certifica-
tion of Road Test.21 The certification form indicates that she operated 
the vehicle controls well, had good· driving posture, ·and correctly exited 
the vehicle to check before backing the van.22 The examiner signed the 
following statement on the certification form: "It is my considered 
opinion that this driver possesses sufficient driving skill to operate safely 
the type of commercial·motor vehicle listed above [a van]."23 
·Later that day, Arezella Manuel underwent a medical examination, 
as required- of all drivers who are to work for a company subject to the 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations ("DOT Regulations"). 24 Ms. 
Manuel's physical examination form reveals that she was assessed as 
being "normal" in all. categories.25 The exam disclosed no' medical 
problems of any kind.26 The doctor's certification, however, states the 
following: ''Patient can't move around swiftly in case of an accident. 
(Does not meet DOT regulatioils)."27 
· The examining physician, Dr. James Norwood Frierson, admitted 
that he examined Ms. Manuel for only five or six minutes.28 The doctor 
20. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Issue of Liability Exhibit 3; EEOC 
v. Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (No. H-95-3981). 
Under EEOC policy, in order to be a bona fide conditional offer of employment, such an 
offer must be conditioned only upon the results of the medical examination and be extended only 
after all other data regarding the applicant is verified. Furthermore, 
[s]ince an employer can ask disability-related questions and require medical examinations 
after a job offer, it is important that the job offer be real. A job offer is real if the 
employer has evaluated all relevant non-medical information which it reasonably could 
have obtained and analyzed prior to giving the offer. 
See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT .. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: 
PREEMPLOYMENT DISABILITY RELATED QUESTIONS AND MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS 18 (1995). 
Altliough the EEOC chose not to litigate this issue in TeXaS Bus Lines, the company's practice of 
conditioning the job offer upon several further steps in the application process still constitutes a 
technical violation of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (1994). 
21. See Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on the Issue of Liability Exhibit 3, EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965 (S.D. 
Tex. 1996) (No. H-95-3981). 
22. See id. 
23. ld. 
24. See Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. at 967 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 391.43 (1995)). 
25. Id. at 978. 
26. See id. 
27. Jd. 
28. See id. 
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boncludedthat Ms. Manuel was not sufficiently mobile based solely upon 
his observation that she had difficulty getting out of her seat in the 
waiting area and that she ''waddled" slowly to the examining room, 
which was eight doors awa~.29 Dr. Frierson further testified that he had 
no· specific training regarding.the duties· of bus drivers,. motor vehicle 
safety, or the. dynamics and consequences ·.of various auto accidents. 30 
He based his deCision coiicernirig Ms. MllJJuel 's. effectiveness in case of 
an accidenLpurely~uponhis,obs~rvationofMs .. Manuel as she walked to 
the examin.ingroom and upon his personal experience as a bus passen-
31 . ger. · . ··· ·. · ·. · · . · · .· 
The DOT regulations do not establish any weight restrictiO]lS for bus 
drivers.32 The regulations mandate that a candidate imist be "physically 
qualified to drive a commercialmotor vehicle in accordance with subpart 
E-Physical Qualifications and Exaininations of part 391."33 Subpart E, 
section. 391.41 qf the re~latiQns, d~tails the· condi)iohs which may 
disqualify a p"oteniial ctriver.3,4 These include thirteen categories of 
ailments, such as'. alcoholism, particular mental diseases, serious 
impairments of .various limbs, etc}5 Obesity is• not listed. ·ill any 
category as a disqualifying condition. Impaired mobility per se is _also not 
listed as. a disqualifying condition. 36 . Rather, the regulations 'specify that 
29. ld. 
30. See id. at 976.77~ 
31. See id. at ~76-78. 
32. See-id .. at973. . 
33. 49 C.F.& § 39i.ll(6) (1995). 
34; See idi § 391.41'. 
35 .. See·id. · ': 
36. · See id. The relevanttext of thjs provision is as follows: 
(a) A person shali not drive a commercial motor vehicle unless he/she is physically 
qualified to do so and, except as provided in § 39 L67, has on his/her person the original, 
or a photographic. copy, of a medical examiner's certificate that he/she is physically 
qualified to drive a commercial motor vehicle. 
(b) A-person is physically qualified-to drive a commercial motor vehicle if that person: 
. (I) Ha5 no loss of a foot, a leg, a hand, or an arm, or has been granted a waiver 
pursuant to § .391.49; 
(2) -Hils no impairment of: 
(i) A himd. or finger which interferes with preh~nsion or power grasping; or. 
' . (ii) An_ arm; foot, or leg which interferes with the ability to perform normal 
tasks associ~t~d with opetatiiig a. commercial motor vehicle; or any other 
sigillficant limb defect or liinitation which interferes with the ability to· 
-perfol'n1,niii'inal tasks associated with operating a. commercial motor vehicle; 
, ot has been grant¢d a waiver pursuant to § 391.49. 
(3) Has no established med.ical history or clinical diagnosis of diabetes mellitus 
currently requiring illiiulin. for control; ' . 
1996] First, Do·No Harm 157 
a driver must not have an impairment of "[a ]n arm, foot, or leg whieh 
interferes with the ability to perform nonnal . tasks .associated with 
operating a commercial motor vehicle; or any· other· significant limb 
defect or limitation which interferes with the ability to perform normal 
tasks ·associated with op~rating a' commercial motor vehicle."37 Thus, 
the regulations do ·not ·address the issue of a driver's ability to handle 
extreme· •emergency situations. 
When its . doctor- refused to provide Manuel with ·a medical 
certification, Texas Bus Lines informed her that she would not be hired 
.(4) Has no current clinical diagnosis of ~yocardial infar~tion, angina pectorls, 
coronary insufficiency, thrombosis, or any other cardiovascular disease of avariety 
known to be accompanied by syncope, dyspnea, collapse; or congestive c~diac 
failur~ .. · . .. . . 
(~) · Has no established .. medical history or clinical diagnosis of a respiratory 
dysfunctiim likely to interfere with his/her ability to control and drive a cominercial· 
motor vehicle safely; 
(6) ;Has no qurrent clinical diagnosis of high blood presswe likely to interf~re with 
his/her apility to operate a commercia] motor. vehicle safely; · 
(7) Has no establish!'!d medical lllsJory or cli~ical diagnosis of rheumatic, aithrii:ic, 
orthopedic; muscular; neuiornus'Cuiar, oi vascular disease which interfenis·witb ·. 
his/her ability to control and operate a commercial motor vehicle safely; 
(8) Has no establ~hed medical history or clinical diagnosis of epilepsy. or any otl:ler 
condition which is likely to cause loss of consciousness or any loss of ability to 
control a· commercial motor vehicle; 
(9) Ha.S no mental, nervous, organic, or functional disease or· psychiatric disoider 
likely to interfere with his/her ability to drive a commercial motor veq.icle safely; 
(1 0) Has distant visual acuity ·of· at least 20/40 (Snellen) in each eye ·without 
corrective lenses or visuaJ.acuity separately corrected to 20/40. (Snellen). or better 
with· corrective lenses, pistant binocular acuity of at .least 20/40 (Snellen) in. both 
eyes with or without corrective lenses, field of vision of at least 70 degrees in the 
horiwntal Meridian in each eye, and th.\! ability to recognize the colors. of traffic 
signals and devices showing standard red, green, and amber; 
(11) First perceives a .forced whispered voice in the better ear at not less than :5 feet 
with or without the use of a hearing aid or, if testecl l:JY use of an audiometric 
device, does not have an average hearing loss in the better ear greater than 40 
decibels at 500Hz, 1,000 Hz, and 2,000 Hz with or without a hearing aid when the 
audiometric device is calibrated to American National Standard (forinerly ASA 
Standard) Z24.S.:-1951. 
(12) Does not use a Schedule I drug or other substance identified in appendix D to 
this subchapter,.an amphetamine, a narcotic, or any other habit-forming di-ug, except 
that a driver may use such a substance or drug if the substance or. drug is prescribed 
by a licensed medical practitioner who is familiar with the driver's it)edical history 
and as8igned duties and who has advised the driver that the prescribed substance 
or drug will not adversely affect the driver's ability to safely operate a commercial 
motor vehicle; and · 
(13) Has no current clinical diagnosis of alcoholism. 
/d.§ 391.4l(a)-(b). 
37. /d. § 391.4I(b)(2)(ii) (emphasis added). 
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by the company.38 The Court found that the company "impermissibly 
discriminated against Arezella Manuel on the basis of a perceived 
disability in violation of 42 U.S;C. § 12101 et seq."39 Specifically, the 
Court ruled as follows: 
Because Texas Bus Lines could determine from Dr. Frierson's 
• examination report that his opinion was not supported by any objective 
.m~-!!1£9!J!!ldmg§,;,@~Lb~.c:a,JJ~Le; T!'!i'as.J3us J.Jjnf)s knew. or should have 
k;n9\Vl). tllat.l).r. ~Frierson's conclusion that Manuel was not physically 
quali;fied for the driver position was not based on the DOT Regulations, ,~ 
Texa,s B¥s.Lines' reliance on Dr. Frierson's opinion was unreasonable. 
Texas Bu5 ~iries knew or should have known that its refusal to hire 
Manuel on'tlie basis of Dr. Frierson's faulty opinion was both improper 
and \riolative of the ADA 40 
Since DOT regulations require that drivers po~se·ss a medical 
exanllri~:f'~' certificate, the court recognized that the bus company could 
not hire Manuel without the appropriate documentation.41 However, the 
opinion ac)vised ·that Texas Bus Lines could have sent Manuel to a 
seconci doctor to obtain the necessary c~rtification.42 The Court conclud-
ed that "[b]ecause Texas Bus Lines' relationship witb Dr. Frierson 
resulted in the discriminatory rejection of Manuel, an individual protected 
l:iy the ADA, Texas Bus Lines is liable for a violation of the ADA."43 
The company's reliance upon the opinion of a medical expert in making 
its adverse. employment decision did not shield it from liability under the 
statute.44 The Court's unprecedented ruling may well have far reaching 
i1llplicatiops ·for similar cases in the future. 
38. See Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. at 967-68. 
39. !d. at 98L 
40. !d. at 973. 
41. See id. at 967. 
42. See id. at 978. 
43. 1d. at 974. 
44. See id. at 973-74. The damages aspect of the case was settled pursuant to a consent decree, 
which awarded damages to Manuel and provided the injunctive relief requested by the EEOC. See 
Consent Order Decree at 2-3, EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965 (S.D. Tex. I 996) (No. 
H-95-3981). Texas Bus Lines agreed to provide ADA training to its examining physicians and 
management employees. !d. at 3. It also agreed to designate a manager who would review all 
negative hiring recommendations made by its doctor to insure that the company's employment 
decisions remain consistent with the requirements of DOT regulations and the ADA. !d. 
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Ill. THE "REGARDED As" THEORY: WHY INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE 
NOT DISABLED ARE COVERED BY THE ADA 
In Texas Bus Lines, the Court found that the examining physician 
erroneously deemed an applicant for employment to be incapable of 
performing a job even·though the individual had no medical condition 
which would in any· way impede her job performance.45 While Ms. 
Manuel was an experienced, qualified driver who was in good health, the 
doctor disqualified her based cin a hypothetical concern that she would 
not be able to move quickly to assist passengers in case of an acci:-
dent.46 One might assume that individuais such as Ms. Manuel, who are 
not in fact disabled but are disqualified due to a doctor's error or 
misconception, are not protected under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act. The statute and its. implementing regulations, however, establish 
otherwise. The Act provides: 
No coyered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with 
a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job 
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of 
employees, employee compensation, job training, and othc;:r terms, 
conditions, and privileges of employment.47 
For an impairnient to rise to the level of a disability, it must 
substantially limit one or more of a person;s major life activities.48 The 
regulations promulgated pursuant to the ADA define the term "major life 
activities" to mean "functions such as caring for oneself, performing 
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and 
working.'>49 The regulations further explain that 
(3) With respect to the major life activity of working -
(i) The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in 
the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in 
various classes as compared to the average person having comparable 
training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single, particular 
45. See Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. at 973. 
46. See id. at 980. 
47. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994). 
48. See id. § 12102(2)(A). 
49. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2)(i) (1995). 
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job does not constitUte a substantial limitation in the major life activity 
of working. 5° 
An individual can.thus be "disabled" for purposes of protection tinder the 
ADA due solely to his or her Jnability to_perform a particular category 
of work, such. as professio~~(.driVing, "o~ av~ety of jobs of different 
types. If,· however, .. a .. medicaL condition prevents an individual from 
. perfoiming only the speci~liz~d tasks of a. single, unique job or a small 
categoryofjohs;··the;[individualwill not be covered by the ADA.51 The 
Act applies oply to persons who are unemployable in a larger sense of 
th~ word. . . 
Iii order to falf withiri the statutory scope, an individual need not be 
actually disabled. Rather, the ADA also covers individuals who have a 
"record of' a disability or who are· "regarded as" having a disability. 52 
Consequently, if 'an employer makes an adverse emplqyment decision 
concerning an . mdividtial whom it Wrongly regards as substantially 
limited in his or her ability to perform a major life function, including 
working, that employer may be grtilty of a violation of the ADA. 53 
The regulations promulgated pursuant to the ADA further elucidate 
this concept: . 
Is regarded as having such an impairment means: 
(1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantial-
ly limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as 
constitUting such limitation; 
(2) Ha8 a physical.or mental impairment that substantially limits 
major life activities only as a resUlt of the attitudes of others toward 
such impairment; or 
(3) Has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (h)(l) or 
(2) of this section but is treated by a covered entity as having a 
substantially limiting impairment. 54 
. ' . ' . 
Claims based upon the "regarded as" component ofthe definition 
of a disabled individual have been evaluated and discussed by several 
courts. In Milton v. Bob Maddox Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. 55 , for exam-
50. !d. § I 630.2(j)(3)(i). 
51. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). 
52. !d. § 121 02(2)(B)-(C). 
53. See id. 
54. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k)(l) (1995). 
55. 868 F. Supp. 320 (S.D. Ga. 1994). 
1996] First, Do No Harm 161 
pie, the court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment, stating 
the following: 
Finally, Milton may qualify for ADA coverage via another route. If he 
can demonstrate that he was simply regarded by his colleagues as 
having a physical impairment substantially limitin:g a major life activity, 
and that this perception led to his disn:iissal, the ADA applies.56 
In assessing the disability discrimination claim brought by an obese 
womanunder sectiori. 504 .of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,57the First 
Circuit, in Cook v. Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, 
Retardation, & Hospitals,58 stated that "[a]n unfounded assumption that 
an applicant is unqualified for a particular job, even if arrived at in good 
faith, is not sufficient to forestall liability" under the Act.59 The Court 
found that defendant's articulated reasons for refusing to hire the 
plaintiff, including its concern that "Cook's limited mobility impeded her 
ability to evacuate patients in case of an emergency. . . . show conclu-
sively that Ml:IRH treated plaintiff's obesity as if it actually affected her 
musculoskeletal and cardiovascular systems."60 
The rationale for including individuals regarded as disabled within 
the ADA~s definition· of "disabled" waS fu~iculated by the Supreme Court 
iil School Board of Nassau County v. Arline61 in the context of the 
Rehabilitation Act. The Court explained: 
By amending the definition of "handicapped individual" to include not 
only those who ate actually physically impaired, but also those who are 
regarded as impaired and who, as a result, are substantially lin:iited in 
56. /d. at 325; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1994) (defining disability); 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(g)(3) (1995) (defining "is regarded as having such impairment''); see also Pritchard v. 
Southern Co. Servs., 4 AD Cas. 465 (BNA) 473 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (holding that the plaintiff failed 
to show that the defendant regarded her as disabled). 
57. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). Cases interpreting the Rehabilitation Act are often applied to 
the ADA, a much newer law for which only a limited body of interpretive case law exists. The 
C.F.R. establishes that, in general, the regulations promulgated to implement the ADA do not apply 
a lesser standard "than the standards applied under [Title V of] the Rehabilitation Act of 1973," or 
the regulations issued by federal agencies pursuant to that title. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.l(h)-(c) (1995). 
Furthermore, the Rehabilitation Act itself provides that "[t]he standards used to determine whether 
this section has been violated in a complaint alleging employment discrimination under this section 
shall be the standards applied under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 .... " 
29 U.S.C. § 79l(g) (1994) (citation omitted). 
58. 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993). 
59. /d. at 27. 
60. /d. at 23. 
61. 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
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a major life activity, Congress acknowledged that society's accumulated 
myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are 
the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment. 62 
In addition, the Code of Federal Regulations states that: 
if an individual can show that an employer or other covered entity 
made an employment decision because of a perception of disability 
based on "myth, fear or stereotype," the individual will satisfY the 
"regarded as" part of the definition of disability. If the employer cannot 
articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action, an 
inference that the employer is acting on the basis of "myth, fear or 
stereotype" can be drawn. 63 
If an individual is not in actu_ality substantially limited in performing 
any major life activity but is deemed disqualified for ::1 job by a doctor 
due to a particular physical condition, the. individual may nonetheless 
enjoy the protection of the ADA.64 An applicant who has been found 
qualified and been offered a job may not be rejected solely due to myths 
or unsubstantiated fears regarding conditions such as epilepsy, HIV, 
diabetes, etc., of which the employer learns via a pre-employment 
medical examination.65 
IV. WHY Is AN EMPLOYER F.ESPONSIBLE FOR THE 
RECOMMENDATION OF ITS MEDICAL EXPERT WHO ERRS 
IN ASSESSING A CANDIDATE? 
It may seem that if a physician mistakenly deems an applicant to be 
unqualified for a particular job, the doctor rather than the employer 
should be held liable for the harm suffered by the rejected candidate. 
Under the ADA, only "an employer, employment agency, labor 
organization or joint labor-management committee" cru1 be sued for a 
violation of the statute.66 In Cmparts Distribution Center Inc. v. 
62. !d. at 284. 
63. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(1) (1995). 
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)-(C) (1994). 
65. See id. 
66. id. § 12111(2). Section 102 of the Act mandates that "[n)o covered entity shall discriminate 
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard 
to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee 
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." !d. 
§ 12112(a). Section 101 of the Act defines a "covered entity" as "an employer, employment agency, 
labor organization, or joint labor-management committee." /d. § 12111(2). 
1996] . First, Do No Harm 163 
Automotive Wholesaler's Ass 'n, 67 the First Circuit ruled that third 
parties could be considered "employers" under certain circumstances.68 
The Court determined that defendants,- members of an administering trust 
for a health benefit plan, would be considered employers "if they 
exercised control ·over an important aspect of ... [the employee's] 
employment."69 Furthermore, the Court determined that defendants 
could be deemed employers if "defendants are 'agents' of a 'covered 
entity,' who act on behalf of the entity in the matter of providing and 
administering employee health benefits."70 By analogy, therefore, 
doctors who are entrusted with the responsibility of certifying employees 
as medically qualified for a particular job could be considered "employ-
ers" due to their exercise of control over the hiring decision. However, 
no court has extended the Carparts ruling to physicians, and it is 
un.knov,m whether any other circuits will follow the First Circuit's 
precedent. 71 
Regardless of the liability of physicians under the statute, the ADA 
holds the employer itself ·responsible for discrimination which results 
from its. association with other entities or individuals, such as medical 
experts. The Act prohibits employers from "participating in a contractual 
or other arrangement or relationship that has the effect of subjecting a 
covered entity's qualified applicant or employee with a disability 
to ... discrimination.'m Thus, if an employer's relationship with a 
physician who conducts medical examinations results in the discriminato-
ry rejection of applicants protected by the ADA, the employer is liable 
for a violation of the statute despite the involvement of a third party, the 
67. 37 F.3d 12 {I st Cir. I 994). 
68. /d. at I 7-18. 
69. /d. at I 7. 
70. !d. 
71. Rejected applicants may also have private rights of action under state law relating to 
financial harms caused by a doctor's negligent fitness evaluation. See, e.g, Armstrong v. Morgan, 
545 S.W.2d 45 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977); Lashlee v. Sumner, 570 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. ·I 978). In 
Armstrong, an employee who was required to pass a physical examination upon being promoted lost 
his job because the physician's report indicated that the employee was in very poor health. 
Armstrong, 545 S.W.2d at 46. According to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, the plaintiffs 
negligence action against the physician stated a valid claim: "Dr. Morgan owed Appellant Armstrong 
a duty not to injure him physically or otherwise. If Dr. Morgan negligently performed the 
examination and as a result gave an inaccurate report of the state of appellant's health, and appellant 
was injured as a proximate result thereof, actionable negligence would be shown." /d. Similarly, in 
Lashlee, an employee sued the employer's consulting psychologist, for "libel, negligence or malprac-
tice, interference with contractual relations, and intentional infliction of emotional distress .... " 
Lashlee, 570 F.2d at 107. 
72. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (1994). 
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doctor, with whom the employer had a professional anangement. That 
is, if a qualified individual protected by the ADA is rejected by an 
employer because the doctor erroneously deemed him or her incapable 
of performing job duties for medical reasons, the employer is liable for 
the decision under the ADA. 73 
The regulations promulgated under the .ADA specifically provide 
that "[t]he results of such [medical] examination shall not be used for 
any purpose inQonsistent with ... [the ADA]."74 Consequently, the 
employer's responsibility for compliance \Vith the statute does not end 
once it refers a candidate to a physician for a pre-employment medical 
e)camination. It is the employer's duty to insure that the ultimate decision 
as to whether to hire an individual in light of the doctor's findings does 
not defy federal law. 
In Piquard v. City of East Peoria/5 the court explained that 
"[s]ection 12112(0)(2) was ... intended to prohibit 5Jii entity fro'in doing 
through a contractual relationship what it may not do directly."76 In 
some cases discrimination might result not from an employer's innocent 
reliance upon the erroneous opinion of a doctor whom it trusts, but rather 
from far more malicious conduct. Some employers may attempt to 
circumvent the statiJte via use of a medical examination. An employer 
may extend conditional offers of employment to qualified individuals and 
then ask its physician to identify and disqualify on "medical grounds" 
any candidate_ who may cause the company to incur the cost of maldng 
an accommodation,77 who may generate increased medical insurance 
costs due to treatment of an existing medical condition, 78 or who may 
file a worker's compensation claim due to the aggravation of past 
injuries. 79 Sii1ce it is milawful for the employer itself to reject a 
candidate because of a disability or perceived disability if the individual 
73. !d. 
74. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(b)(2) (1995). 
75. 887 F. Supp. 1106 (C.D. Ill. 1995). 
76. !d. at 1124 (holding that "[a]n entity may not contract with organizations which provide 
employee fringe benefits if the relationship subjects the disabled employee" to discrimination 
prohibited by the ADA); See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1IJ), at 36 (1990) .. 
77. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B) (1994) ("[D]enying employment opportunities to a job 
applicant or""employee who is an other\vise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is 
based on the need of such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or 
mental impainnenis of the employee or applicant."). 
78. Cf. id. § 12112(a) (stating that it "is unlawful to discriminate in the hiring of "a qualified 
individual with a.disability b_ecause of the disability .... "). 
79. See 29 C.F.R. pt. i630 app. § 1630.2(m) (1995) (providing that the determination of 
whether a disabled individual is qualified "should not be based on speculation that the employee . 
. . may cause increased health insurance premiums or workers' compensation costs."). 
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can do the job with or without a. reasonable ac<::ommodation,80 the 
employer cannot utilize a doctor to aGhieve illicit goals.81 
V. WHEN Is IT PROPER FOR AN EMPLOYER TO REJECT A CANDIDATE 
. BA~EIJ oN A DocToR's Ass:EssMENT oF His oR 
l!ERl\1EDICAL CONDITION{ 
Although an employer rpust be c1:1utious in accepting a doctor's 
advice not. to hire an applicant . due to. a.'. disabilitY, physicians may 
nonetheless. proVide valuable infonliation .. to 'an employer, and the 
utilization ofmedical .exams·in the.hiring process .is not discouraged by 
the ADA S.2 Doctors Qan be trusted to. m~e accurate diagnoses of the 
clinical con.ditions. of applicant!?, to evaluate, the risks characteristic of 
varidUS;IDalapies, and to predict the course that C~rtain diseases will take. 
Doctors, however, do not possess legal expertise relating to the ADA and 
other federal regulations and often have· little, if any, knowledge ·of the 
duties and requirements of the job to which the applicant would be 
assigned. Because doctors areill equipped to decide whethe~ rejection of 
an individllillwould ccmstitute an ADA violation, itis the employer who 
must scrutinize the medical data n3ceived from the doctor and determine 
its legaJ obligations With respect to the individual in question. 
. How~yer, in some. instances !l. doctor may !n fact detect a disability 
which prech,tde~ an individual from perfonmng the job duties in question. 
in such ¢ases employers would be fully justified in relying upon the 
doctor's. diagnosis to make a negative hiring decision. , 
First, the doctor m~y, discover that. an indhjdual has .a disabling 
medical condition .which cannot be accommodated by the employer 
without undue hard~bip:83 The determination of whether an accommoda-
tion such as job restructuring, purchase of equipment, a change in work 
schedule, or modification of facilities would impose ari undue hardship 
80. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12112(5)(B) (1994). 
81. See Patrick G. IJerr, Ethical Considerations in Fitness and Risk Evaluations; 3 OCCUPA-
TIONAL MED.: ST. ART REVIEWS, 193, 207 (1988). The author potes the following: 
. Unethical employers, sadly,. can present honest.ahd cimscientim,Is physicians with 
insoluable [sic] prqblem5 concerning the ethical )landling of information about employees 
and applicants. Persoi:mel directors who refuse to hire any individuai recommended "with 
accorninodations," or who demand th~ results -of drug tests that they are plainly 
incompetent to interpre~ can put physicians into a. position where professional honesty 
is used to serve corporate irresponsibility. 
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upon an employer is made on a case-by-case basis and is dependant upon 
the cost of the accommodation. and the· resources . of the entity in 
question. 84 · 
'In ·one case, for example, a court determined that the Voice of 
America was not required to . hire a severe diabetic for assignment 
overseas as a radio engineer, since most ofthe foreign appointments were 
hardship posts that were not near adequate medical facilities. 85 Due to 
tile. nlinim~L;distrihution"of personnel overseas and the eiilployer's need 
for operational :flexibility; the court ruled that promising the diabetic 
ii:J.dividualthat he would work only in nonhardship posts would impose 
an undue hardship upon the employer.86 In the context of the Rehabili-
tation Act,· one· court. held that it was proper for the Army Corps of 
Engineers-to orefuse to hire an individual with a heart condition· for the 
84. The relevant provisions of the ADA establish the following: 
(9) Reasonable. accommodation 
The tefui "reaso~able accommodiltiori" maY include-
( A) maJa~g ~xisting facilities used by e!Jlployees readily accessible to and usable 
by individuals wiLh disabilities; and 
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a 
vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate 
adjustment or modification of examinations, training materials or policies,. the 
provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for 
individuals with disabilities. 
(10) Undue hardship 
(A) In general· 
the . terril ''undue hardship" means an action requiring significant difficulty or 
expense, when considered in light of the factors set forth in subparagraph (B). 
(B) FiiCtors ,W be consipered 
rn detednlning whether an adi::omrnodation would impose an undue hardship on a 
covered entity, faCtors to be consideied include 
(i) the. nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter; 
(ii) the overall fmancial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the 
provision of the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed 
at such facility; the effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise 
of such accommodation upon the operation of the facility;· 
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the 
business of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the 
number, type, and location ofits facilities; and 
(iv) the t)ipe ·of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the 
.composition; structure, and fuilctions of the workforce of such entity; the 
geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or 
facilities· in question to the covered entity. 
ld. § 12111(9)-(10). 
85. See Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1187-88 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1538 
(1994). 
86. See id. at 1188. 
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arduous job of park technician. 87 The court reasoned, "[g]iven that only 
two to· four other workers are· available. at any given. time to patrol the 
150,000 acres at Clark's Hill Lake and in light of the agency's limited 
resources,'' the employer could not accommodate the applicant without 
undue hardship. 88 Likewise, the federal regulations explain that a 
nightclub would not be required to hire an applicant with a disabling 
visual impairment which forced the individual to work only in brightly 
lit areas ifthe nightclub could establish that bright lighting would destroy 
its ambience and/or make it difficult for customers to view a stage 
show.89 
· ··In addition, certain conditions· cannot be accommodated at all due 
either to their nature or to the nature of the job at issue. For example, 
DOT regulations preclude individuals with particular conditions, 
including epilepsy and insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus, from serving 
as drivers for companies governed by those regulations.90 Thus, if a 
doctor learned that an individual had one of the conditions that by law 
precludes the candidate from employment, the employer would be fully 
justified in rejecting that applicant based on the doctor's determination. 
The ADA also allows employers to refuse to hire a ca~didate whose 
p~l.ll· Dlu~•yrrrlPnt in ~ n~rtt("-. ... ll~r J;n.h ,un:n lrl "nncop ~ rliT,:::::a·r--t. t'hrp~t tn thPI hP-:t lt-h 
- T.o. ........... _ .... ..._.., .,o..&...&- .C-.... .. ~w ,... __ VU YYVU£~ j-'VUV 1!...5. '-5-.!..!.VVL L..LL!.V(...I.L LV ~V .LJ.VU.!Lll 
or saf~ty of other indivi,duals in the workplace"91 or to his or her own 
physical welfare.92 The regulations promulgated pursuant to the ADA 
providethat "[i]n determining whether an individual would pose a direct 
threat, the factors to be considered include: 1) The duration of the risk; 
2) The nature and severity of the potential harm; 3) The likelihood that 
the potential harm will occur; and 4) The imminence of the potential 
harm."93._, . 
In Department of Labor v. Texas Industries/4 the Department of 
Labor, Employment Standards Division cautioned that an employer 
cannot assert a direct threat defense under the Rehabilitation Act unless 
it makes a showing of a "reasonable probability of substantial harm."95 
The court held that the employer had failed to show a sufficient risk of 
87. See Treadwell v. Alexander, 707 F.2d 473 (lith Cir. 1983). 
88. Id. at 478. 
89, See 29 C.F.R. 1630 app. § 1630.2(p) (1995). 
90. See id. § 39l.4l(b). 
91. 42 u.s.c. § 12113(b) (1994). 
92. See 29 C.F.R. 1630 app. § 1630.2(r) (1995). 
93. ld. 
94. 47 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 18 (1988). 
95. ld. at 27. 
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future injury to justify the rejection of an otherwise qualified cement 
truck driver where a physician testified that her transitional vertebra and 
prior back surgery made her more likely to suffer sudden pain or back 
spasm than individuals who did riot have her medical history.96 ·. 
Similady, in the Texas Bus Lines case, the defendant contended that 
Ms. Manuel posed a direct threat to the safety of passengers because she 
would be unable to move quickly in case of an accident.97 The Court 
rejectedtth-e~cunipanyis~argument,":finding·the following: 
[T]he ijkelihood of potential harm as a result of Maimel's weight · 
fuipedihg lier service to her passengers is too remote and ·does not 
constitute grounds for a viable defense under the ADA. Despite Texas 
Bus Lines'. assertions that Manuel· posed a "direct threaf' to the "men, 
women and children passengers" that it transports, such theoretical 
COIJ:C~rns do U()t s~rve as a. basis for the direct !br~at defense. An 
employer cannot assert a direct threat defense unless it makes a 
showing of a reasonable probability of substantial harm.98 
Thus, if a doctor detects a back condition or other medical symptoms 
which might affect an individual's performance in a way that would 
eridariger the empioyee, coworkers, or customers, the doctor must 
evaluate both the kind of harin that could occur, and the likelihood that 
it will occur. 
To illustrate with greater specificity, let us focus upon the phenome-
na of back injuries and low back pain, which have been extensively 
analyzed. by ~physicians specializing in occupational medicine.99 One 
article notes that "[s]tudies indicate that 21% of all compensable work 
injuries and 33% of workers' compensation costs are attributable to low 
back pain, resiiltipg in some 400,000 back injuries in the United States 
per year."100 Scholars have concluded, however, that "[ d]espite 
extensive research arid a large number of publications, scientific 
understanding of the etiology and prevention of low back pain remains 
weak and "frequently speculative."101 
96. See id. at 28. 
97. See EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965, 979-80 (S.D. Tex. 1996). 
98. Id. at 980. 
99. See-Jay S. Himmelstein & Gunnar B.J. Anderson, Low Back Pain: Risk Evaluation and 
Preplacement Screening, 3 OCCUPATIONAL MED.: ST. ART REVJEWS 255 (1988). 
1 00. /d. (citations omitted). 
101. /d. . . . 
1996] First, Do No Harm 169 
Research has shown that up to seventy percent of X-rays taken 
durip.g pre~employment examinations show abnormalities.102 Similarly, 
a study concluded that only fifty percent of patients between the ages of 
forty and seventy who complained of low back pain had X-ray abnor-
malities, while twenty-two patients who did not suffer any back distress 
showed abnormalities. 103 therefore, researchers have concluded that 
"low back x-rays have loW" sensitivity and low specificity, and conse-
quently a low predictive value."104 Likewise, physical strength and 
endurance tests, designed to determine the likelihood of future back 
injury, were found to have a predictive value of ollly twenty-two 
percent. 105 Since "there are few degenerative or developmental criteria 
that can be applied to an individual to reasonably predict the risk oflow 
back disability,"106 employers . should not utilize predictive screening 
techniques for back problems as an exclusive basis for negative hiring 
decisions.107 
Nevertheless, it is possible for employers to establish a "direct 
threat" defense based on a doctor's findings, and such defenses have 
been accepted by the courts. In Bradley v. University of Texas MD. 
Anderson Cancer Center, 108 the Fifth Circuit affirmed a lower court's 
decision granting summary judgment to a hospital that had terminated an 
HIV-positive surgical technician. 109 The court determined that the 
nature of the technician's work created some risk of disease transmittal, 
since be "often [ c'ame] within inches of open wounds and plac[ ed] his 
band in the body cavity roughly once a day." 110 The court acknowl-
edged that the risk of transmitting the virus was very small but found 
that due to the potentially catastrophic consequences of an accident, the 
technician posed a direct threat to the health and safety of patients and 
thus was not protected by the ADA. 111 Similarly, an employer would 
not be required to hire an applicant with narcolepsy for a carpentry job 
involving the frequent handling of power saws and other dangerous 
102. See id. at 261. 
103. See id. at 261-62. 
104. Id. at 261 (citation omitted). 
105. See id. at 265. 
106. ld. at 263-64. 
107. See id. at 266-67. 
108. 3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1071 (1994). 
109. See id: at 922, 935. 
110. /d. at 924. 
111. See id. (citing Doe v. Washington Univ., 780 F. Supp. 628, 632-34 (E.D. Mo. 1991) 
(deciding that an HIV -positive dental student is not otherwise qualified to perform invasive 
procedures because the risks defy the axiom [of the medical profession] to at least do no harm}). 
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equipment, if the individual often and unexpectedly loses consciousness 
and no accommodation exists that would reduce or eliminate the 
risk.m 
Some applicants who do not constitute a "direct threat" under the 
statutory definition but who learn of a ·potentially dangerous medical 
condition through a pre~employment physical, may choose voluntarily to 
declirie the job. offer in question and not to 'asSUme the risk of injury.II3 
In some_ i.Pstallc~S;,.~ .. d~o~tQr may inform the employer that a particular 
applicant'sback i!llpai.rnlent or other condition presents only a very small 
risk of. injury to himself or others in light of the job duties to be 
performed. In Such a case; the employer would be prohibited from 
withdrawing···. the -candidate's conditional offer of employment. 114 
Nevertheless, the. applicant, upon learning of the diagnosis, may decide 
to seek other employment whicli would not similarly jeopardize his or 
her health. 
VI. WHAT STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN BY EMPLOYERS TO· INSURE 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE ADA WHEN UTILIZING 
PRE-EMPLOYMENT PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS? 
Employers are notfree to. blindly accept a doctor's recommendation 
not to hire an individualbased .upon a particular diagnosed physical 
condition.115 If the ·applicant's rejection is deemed- by a judge or a jury 
to violate the ADA, the involvement of a medical specialist in the 
decision-making process will not serve as a defense for the employ-
er.II6 
· Employers would be well advised to take several steps to insure that 
acceptance of a doctor's negative hiring recommendation will not 
contravene the anti-discrimination mandate of the ADA. Employers 
should provide their examining physicians with extensive information 
regarding the jobs to which applicants will be assigned as well as 
instruction regarding the ADA and any other applicable law, such as 
DOT Regulations. In addition, the employer must independently analyze 
any negative medical report received from the physician in order to 
112. See 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(r) (1995). 
113. See generally Patrick G. Den', Ethical Considerations in Fiiness and Risk Evaluations, 3 
OCCUPATIONAL MED.: ST. ART REVIEWS 193, 200-01 (1988) (discussing such a scenario). 
114. See 29 C.F.R. 1630 app. § 1630.2(r) (1995). 
115. See Texas Bus Lilies, 923 F. Supp. at 973. 
116. See id. at 982. 
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determine its responsibilities under the law with respect to the applicant 
in question. 
First, the employer should furnish the doctor with a detailed job 
description for each applicant examined. If available, a variety of other 
informational sources can also be provided to the physician to increase 
his or her understanding of the jobs for which candidates are being 
evalqated; These include "task analyses done by industrial engineering 
or labor relations specialists to determine compensation rates, job task 
inventories made by trainers, and functional job descriptions 'done by 
nurses and physical and occupational therapists to assess the stresses on 
muscles and joints and the skills needed to perform the work."117 
In addition, the physician should be given an opportunity to visit the 
job site in order to observe employees engaged in the tasks implicated in 
each job. If all tasks cannot be observed at one time, the doctor might be 
supplied with videotapes of individuals performing their various job 
duties. 118 
In order to accurately assess each candidate's ability to perform his 
or her designated job, the physician· should analyze a plethora of 
information-about both the individual's physical condition and the actual 
work duties required. A physician, for example, may find that a patient 
has a particular back problem which requires a lifting restriction. Without 
knowing exactly what lifting requirements the particular job entails, the 
physician cannot intelligently judge whether or not to recommend 
disqualification of the individual. 
Secondly, doctors conducting pre-employment examinations should 
be given intensive training with respect to the ADA. They must be 
instructed that if they diagnose a physical condition that may limit the 
applicant's ability to perform particular job duties, they cannot automati-
cally deem the individual in question disqualified for that reason. 119 
Rather, if the applicant is a qualified individual with a disability, 120 the 
117. Suzanne H. Rodgers, Job Evaluation in Worker Fitness Determination, 3 OCCUPATIONAL 
MED.: ST. ART REVIEWS 219, 221 (1988). 
118. See id. at 222. 
119. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3) (1995). 
120. See id. § 1630.2(m). If the applicant does not fit within the definition of a "qualified 
individual with a disability," the person is not protected by the ADA and need not be accommodated 
by the employer. See id. Thus, if the person is suffering from a temporary condition such as a broken 
bone, which prevents hiring at a particular time, the employer may advise the individual to reapply 
at a later time without violating the law. See id. § 1630.2(j). Similarly, if the condition does not 
significantly impair the individual in any way other than preventing him or her from performing the 
specialized work duties of one unique job, the candidate will fall outside the purview of the ADA. 
See id. § I630.2(j)(3)(i). 
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einployerllnd the capdidate must first discuss what reasonable 11ccommo'" 
dations could be prdvided to enhance job performance. 121 The doctor 
niay faCilitate such discussions by suggesting possible accommodations. 
Ftirthertnore, doctors·:iJ:iustleam that' if a candidate is diagnosed with a 
condition that might impede his' br her ability to function 'safely ahvorlC; 
the doctor mtist •assess all of the factors teievanf to the "direct threat'' 
defense disch.s~ed. .~hov~. 122 A ooctor, -for exinnple, cannot declare an 
i;nQiviclllaJ:tlDDtJQ_\YQ!:k,i_:L!h~teis ·only ·a inihimal chance of injury to 
himself ofothei-s or· if the condition is a degenerative one 'and no harm 
is likel:y to od:u:dbi many years. 123 . ' -
_ 'SiririladJ;'theoerb:ployet must: discuss with the doctor the accuracy 
and predi¢):ive yahie, pf the testing done for each individual who receives 
a negativeJmingr~co~(mdation. If the testsgenerally do not effective-
ly predict the eventual course oftliepatient's condition or the symptoms 
to b~ suffered by the individuaL in the future, 124 the en:iployer must be 
cognizant of these till.~ertaintie~. ' · 
·A tension may exist between the ADA standard and the doctor's 
professional training 'and- inclination to take every precaution with each 
patient to mfnimiz~ -if· not. eliminate ·the risk of any· harm. 125 While 
doctors may ~e inclined -to- disq~alify aU. i~dividuals who have any risk 
of injury, no matter .how small, -under federal law, individuals with 
disabilities cannot be deprived of the opportunity to work and support 
thems.elves · Unless • serious and specific hazards are imminent. 12•6 Thus 
it is up to the emplby~r to· scrutinize the medical data garnered by the 
physician and: to .. critically evaluate the doctor's assessment of the 
individual'sabHityto wprk inlight of the strictures of the ADA. 
Consequent:ly; iii: addition to educating its examining physicians, the 
employer itseJfsh~uld designate a management level employee to serve 
121. See 42U.S.C: § l2112(b)(5)(A) (1994). 
Iii. See 29 c:F.R. § 1630.2(r)(l995). 
·J23. See id .. 
124. As discussed earlier, back x-rays, for example, have a very low predictive value. See Jay 
S. Himme~stein & Gunnar B.J. Anderson, Low Back Pain: RiSk Evaluation and Preplacement 
Screening, 3 OCCUPAtJONALMED.: ST. ART REVIEWS255, 261-62 (1988). 
125 .. The Hippocratic Oath includes the following affuin;!.tion: "[l]nto whatsoev'~r house you 
shall enter, itshallbe fciphe good of the sick tci the Utinost ofyour power,you holding yourselv~s 
far alooffroni wrong . , . you will exercise your art' solely for the ctire of your patients : ... " THE 
NEW COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 1246 (Williiun H: H~s & Judith S. Levey eds., 4th ed. 1975); see 
Patrick· G. Derr, Et[lical:ConsiderationS in' Fitness and Risk Evaluations, 3 OCCUPATIONAL MEn.: 
ST. ART· REVIEWS 193, 194 (1988) (statipg that."a physician whO is indifferent to health and !if~ (or 
worse, who knoWingly causes death, . disease, or disability) abandons medicine as an ethical 
profession."), · · · . ' · · ' 
126. See 4fU.S.C§ 12il3 (i994). 
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as its ADA expert and to review l').ll negative hiring recommendations 
made by the doctors. This specialist should review the results of the pre-
employment physical to deteimine whether the doctor's opinion is based 
upon valid cpnical data established as a, result of thorough, accurate, and 
reliable medlcal testing., PX is.!bi:!Sed upon the doctor's subjective and 
unfounded a,ssumpt:lons, rnyths, stereotypes,. or fears. 
·In the Texas Bus Lines.,case, tpe court determined that Defendant 
wa,s liable for . discrimination because the doctor's examination report 
clearly. indicated •it4at his opinion was n.ot supported by any objective 
medical findings." 127 The doctor conducted no 11gility tests and bas~d 
his concl~sjon about ¢e applicant's ip.ability to. respond properly to 
emergency situations purely on his observation that "she had some 
difficulty getting .out .of h~r seat in the waiting area and that she 
'waddled' . slowly to the examining room, eight doors away."128 . Had 
Texas Bus Lines analyzed the doctor's conclusion and questioned his 
reasoning. rather than blindly accepted his. decision, it would have very 
likely avoided violating the law. 
Thus, it would be wise for employers to question examining 
physicians regarding the extent of testing they have conducted and the 
basis for their medical conclusions .. If, for example, a doctor deems an 
applicant unquali:fie~t.due to a back condition or other iimb impairment, 
the erp.ployermust inquire as to the doctor'sassessment of the likelihood 
and nature of the potential harm and the predictiv.e value of the medical 
procedures conducted. In . cases where tpe ;~mployer retains lingering 
que,stions regarding ,the validity of the doctor's evaluation after an 
extensive dis.cussio11 of the exalltination and its results, it would be 
prudent to send the applic~t to ~ different physician for a second 
opinion. . . 
. The steps· outlined above will not guarantee compliance with the 
ADA in all instances. It is possible that an employer who educates its 
examining physicians and conscientiously analyzes the doctor's 
recommendation may still be found by a judge or a jury to have reached 
the wrong conclusion in refusing to hire a specific candidate. Such 
efforts, however, will vastly reduce the likelihood of a violation, and at 
the very least, should ·enable the employer to eschew the award of 
punitive damages to the plaintiff. 129 
. 127. Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. 8\]pp. at 9?3. 
128. !d. at 978. . · . 
129. Punitive damages are appropriate when a plaintiff proves that the employer engaged in 
discrimination "with malice or with. reckl~ss indifference to the federally protected rights of an 
174 HofStra Labor Law Journal [Vol. 14:151 
Vll. CONCLUSION 
The ADA seeks to protect individuals who have been "subjected to 
a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of 
political powerlessness in our society, based on characteristics that are 
beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypic 
assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such 
in&vidmilscto participate in, and contribute to, society."130 In an effort 
to combatthe discrimination to which individuals with real or perceived 
disabilities have historically been subjected, the law endeavors "to 
provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards."131 
In order to effectuate the anti-discrimi11ation mandate of the ADA, 
the courts must hold employers responsible for all of their hiring 
decisions, including those based upon the advice of a physician. The 
statute would have little meaning if employers could escape liability by 
referring applicants to doctors whose hiring recommendations are subject 
to no scrutin.y. 
If reliance upon a doctor's opinion, no matter how incompetent or 
ignorant, served as a defense under the ADA, employers might routinely 
circumvent the requirements of the law, and countless individuals would 
lose the benefits of its protection. If doctors were omnipotent under the 
statute, Some employers might even be tempted to utilize physical 
examinations in a manipuh,tive and deliberate fashion to exclude from 
employment applicants who are protected by the ADA but are deemed 
undesiraole by the employer. Thus, individuals fully capable of 
performing the job in question could be rejected merely because they 
might cost the company some money due to a history of cancer, a 
disability requiring an accommodation, or a genetic mutation which 
might increase the likelihood of a person's suffering a devastating illness 
in the future. If not held accountable by law, employers could merely 
instruct their examining physicians to disqualify all individuals who 
aggrieved individual." 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(l) (1994). The purpose of punitive damages is to punish 
the defendant for its unlawful conduct and to deter other employers from behaving similarly. See 
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 352 (5th ed. ! 979). An employer that makes every effort to ascertain 
that its hiring decisions are consistent with the ADA is unlikely to be judged to have acted with 
malice or reckless indifference to the rights of the victim of a mistaken employment decision. See 
EEOC v. Texas Bus Lines, 923 F. Supp. 965 (S.D. Tex. 1996). 
130. 42 U.S.C. § 1210l(a)(7) (1994). 
131. !d.§ 1210l(b)(2). 
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might pose a financial risk to the company and to attribute the rejection 
on official documents to some fabricated medical reason. 
Since, under the ADA, the employer itself cannot refuse to hire a 
candidate due to a disability or perceived disability, it is senseless to 
deem a protected individual's rejection acceptable solely because of the 
participation of a doctor in the decision-making process. Employers must 
independently assess the negative hiring recommendations of their 
examining physicians to ascertain that they are based on valid medical 
data and consistent with the requirements of the law. Only in this way 
might we progress towards the goal of assuring "equality of opportunity, 
full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency"132 
for all individuals covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act. 
132. Jd. § 1210l(a)(8). 
